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We propose an analysis of the persistent at risk of poverty (PARP) rate in Italy at the
beginning of the Great Recession (2007–2010). Italy represents an interesting case
study because it has one of the highest PARP rates in Europe, together with a weak
labour market, an inadequate social security system, and a pronounced territorial
dualism. EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) longitudinal data are
used. Logistic regression is applied to disentangle the relationship between household
and main earner characteristics and the likelihood of being persistently poor. According
to our results, male employees are more likely to hamper persistent poverty for their
households; the opposite holds true for women as family breadwinner. Human capital
endowment also shows a relevant role in preventing persistent poverty. The presence
of children, instead, makes households more vulnerable. The South disadvantage
slightly decreases at the beginning of the crisis. This is due to the worsening economic
conditions in the North and Centre, affected to a wider extent by the economic
downturn. The Italian welfare system appears ineffective in protecting worse-off
households, and policies aimed at protecting employment, supporting women labour
force participation, the elderly, and households with children would be needed.
Keywords: Poverty, Persistent poverty, Longitudinal data, EU-SILC, Italy
JEL classification: I32, C25Introduction
The framework of Europe 2020, the European Union’s growth strategy for the decade,
shows policymakers’ increasing interest in poverty issues: one of the five headline tar-
gets consists in reducing poverty or social exclusion, by lifting 20 million people out of
poverty by 2020 (European Commission 2010). The definition of adequate policies,
however, needs to rely not only on a measure of the level of poverty or social exclusion
characterising a country but also on a clear knowledge of the underlying processes and
trigger factors. For this reason, in the set of indicators used by the European Union
(EU) to monitor social inclusion, the at risk of poverty (ARP) rate is complemented by
the persistent at risk of poverty (PARP) rate that provides a more detailed picture of
how consistently households experience poverty in time (Őzdemir and Ward 2010).
According to Eurostat, the ARP is the share of people with an equivalised disposable
income below the ARP threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised
disposable income. The PARP is then defined as the share of individuals at risk of poverty
during the current year and at least two out of the three previous ones (Eurostat 2012).2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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18.2 and 11.6 % in 2010. They are 16.4 and 9.6 % in the EU27 in the same year.
Broadly, in Italy about 64 % of the poor have been living in this condition persistently.
Furthermore, Italy shows territorial dualism in terms of poverty or social exclusion
(Istat 2011a), characterised by an extremely disadvantaged South, especially when per-
sistent poverty is taken into account.
The causes of the Italian situation are a dual labour market combined with a scarcely
supportive welfare system (Devicienti et al. 2014). As far the labour market is con-
cerned, middle-aged employees in medium-large firms are the most protected category,
because they have access to more stable jobs and may benefit of social protection insur-
ance in case of need, while women and young workers typically get into short-term,
low-paying jobs with limited access to social insurance schemes (Baldini and Ciani 2011).
The welfare state, belonging to the so-called Southern-European or Mediterranean model
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Gal 2010), does not provide universal or means-tested policies
addressed to the most vulnerable households and strongly relies on family ties and intra-
families support. Moreover, the persistence of division of roles by gender represents a
weakness. The job loss or a decreased labour income by the breadwinner, typically a man,
is not balanced by other household members’ economic resources (Pasqua 2008;
Figari et al. 2011).
The territorial dualism is associated with a stronger division of traditional roles and a
weaker labour market, in terms of quality and quantity of labour supply, in the South.
Lower women’s labour force participation, higher unemployment rates, and lower earn-
ings are observed (Istat 2011b, c).
This study is the first to shed light on persistent poverty, as defined in the framework
of the EU indicators to monitor poverty and social exclusion, in the Italian context.
Our results are especially relevant in a context characterised by a welfare system unable
to let worse-off households escape poverty.
Particularly, we propose two specific research hypotheses: (i) households relying on
income from dependent employment—more protected by social insurance—are
expected to be associated with lower levels of persistent poverty, while a disadvantage
for households whose main earner is a woman is expected because women traditionally
play a secondary economic role in Italy; (ii) territorial differences are expected to
increase in a period of crisis, because the possible causes of persistent poverty are more
prevalent in the South and not tackled by the welfare system.
We refer to the Eurostat definition of the PARP and compare persistently poor
individuals with the rest of the population, using logistic regression on the Italian EU
statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) longitudinal data. Household and
main earner characteristics, as well as potential trigger events, are taken into account.
This approach allows us to disentangle the role played by the possible determinants of
poverty as a persistent experience.
Our results show that if the main source of income is from dependent employment,
households are less likely to be persistently poor, while income from self-employment,
pensions, or other sources let households worse off. The presence of a woman as the
main earner of the household is associated with a higher risk of being persistently poor,
as for the presence of children. Finally, the South shows much worse economic condi-
tions than the rest of the country, even if such a disadvantage decreases at the
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tion activities in the North and Centre.
Extremely limited and highly fragmented income maintenance schemes, together
with low participation of women to the labour market, contribute to explain high levels
of persistent poverty in Italy and territorial dualism. Policies aiming at protecting em-
ployment and supporting women labour force participation as well as households with
children are needed to lift persistently poor households out of this condition.
This paper is structured as follows. The theoretical and Italian frameworks are illus-
trated, respectively, in the “Previous literature” and “The Italian picture and research
hypotheses” sections. The data and method of the analysis are described in the “Data
and methods” section. The main results are discussed in the “Results” section, and the
“Conclusions” section concludes.
Previous literature
A vast literature studies poverty as a dynamic process, complementing the already well-
established research on poverty as a static phenomenon. Different approaches have
been applied, depending on the main focus of the research (see Aassve et al. 2006, for a
survey). They range from the analysis of poverty patterns or profiles that investigates
how permanent or recurrent poverty is, as well as the household and individual charac-
teristics associated with a more consistent experience of being poor (Muffels et al.
2000; Gardiner and Hills 1999; Fouarge and Layte 2005); to poverty transitions that
allow to identify characteristics and events that trigger poverty exits and prevent from
poverty re-entries (Bane and Ellwood 1986; Jenkins 2000; Fouarge and Layte 2005;
Aassve et al. 2006; Vandecasteele 2010; Andrioupoulou and Tsakloglou 2011a); to
income dynamics through variance component models (Stevens 1999); and to
counterfactual decomposition methods to assess the impact of socio-demographic
and labour market country-specific characteristics on poverty (Dickens and Ellwood
2004; Damioli 2010).
In this paper, we focus on the PARP rate: it is based on the longitudinal component
of the EU-SILC that follows individuals during 4 years. Persistently poor individuals are
ARP at the current year and at least two out of the preceding three ones. Thus, our ap-
proach of analysis is close to that applied to poverty patterns or profiles (Muffels et al.
2000), but only two groups of individuals are taken into account: the persistent and
non-persistent poor.
So far, not much attention has been devoted to an in-depth analysis of this indicator
(Őzdemir and Ward 2010; Maître et al. 2011; Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2011; 2014).
Jenkins and Van Kerm (2011; 2014) claim that PARP can be predicted by ARP, through
an existing near-linear relationship between these indicators. However, the analyses of
the PARP indicator allow to shed a light on the most vulnerable households, which are
not able to escape from the poverty condition. To this purpose, we take into account
various poverty determinants, in terms of household characteristics and experienced
events, besides those directly related to our main research hypotheses. To understand
the effects of the current crisis, we also consider how the relationship between persist-
ent poverty and its determinants evolves.
It is worth noting that the definition of income poverty is based on the equivalised
disposable income that is the sum of all household and household members’ income
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the assumption of income pooling, i.e. all household members have the same access to
economic resources and the latter are used to achieve common household goals.
Although such an assumption has been questioned (Donni and Chiappori 2011;
Ponthieux 2013), it is still widely adopted in the study of poverty. Thus, poverty is de-
fined at the household level, because all individuals belonging to the same household
are expected to benefit from the same economic resources and they all are experiencing
the same poverty status.
Several household characteristics contribute to determine poverty status, the likeli-
hood to exit or re-enter it, and the persistence of such a condition. Particularly, the
presence of children, the elderly, or other members unable to participate in the labour
market are associated with a high level of persistence (Aassve et al. 2006; Devicienti
et al. 2014). The household head is representative of the household economic condi-
tion. If he/she has a scarce earning capacity, because of a low level of education, and
he/she is not well suited for the labour market, either very young or old, the household
is more likely to live in poverty (Devicienti et al. 2014).
Apart from household characteristics, relative changes matter in keeping households
persistently in poverty. Changes in household members’ employment conditions and
earning capacity indeed have been found to account for most of poverty transitions
(Jarvis and Jenkins 1997; Muffels et al. 2000; McKernan and Ratcliffe 2005). Further-
more, household changes in terms of size and the household head, and demographic
events as new births, union formation or dissolution, new household formation are also
likely to trigger poverty transitions (McKernan and Ratcliffe 2005; Fouarge and Layte
2005; Aassve et al. 2006; Vandecasteele 2010).
Other research has been devoted to disentangle to what extent the persistence in
poverty is determined by household members’ characteristics (observed and unob-
served), or to the previous experience of poverty itself. Evidence suggests that there is a
direct effect from current to future poverty (Biewen 2009; Cappellari and Jenkins 2004;
Aassve et al. 2006; Andrioupoulou and Tsakloglou 2011a, b). However, this issue is
beyond the scope of our analysis.
The Italian picture and research hypotheses
Italy represents an interesting case study because it features one of the highest ARP
rates in the European Union (see Fig. 1). In 2010, it was 18.2 %, about 2 percentage
points higher than the EU27 mean (16.4 %). Germany and the UK have lower rates
(15.6 and 17.1 %, respectively), while poverty is higher in Spain (20.7 %). The PARP rate
was 11.6 % in Italy and 9.6 % in EU27. The aforementioned countries show lower
persistence (9.1 % in Germany, 7.4 % in the UK, and 11 % in Spain), and only four
countries—Portugal, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania—exhibit higher figures. By com-
paring the PARP with the ARP, a rough estimate1 of the share of individuals persistently
poor among the poor can be provided. In 2010, the 63.7 % of the poor have experienced
this condition persistently in Italy, in comparison with 58.5 % for the EU27 citizens,
43.3 % in the UK, 53.1 % in Spain, and 58.3 % in Germany. Only six countries—Cyprus,
Portugal, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Romania, and Greece—achieved higher ratios.
The experience of poverty is extremely heterogeneous over the national territory, the












































































































































Fig. 1 At risk of poverty and persistent at risk of poverty rates by country, 2010. Source: Eurostat database
Coppola and Di Laurea Genus  (2016) 72:3 Page 5 of 17household income is about 75 % of that in the North—go together with a higher pro-
portion of severely deprived households:2 12.9 % in 2010, more than twice and three
times than in the Centre and North (5.6 and 3.7 %, respectively) (Istat 2011a). Other
relevant indicators of poverty, as absolute and relative poverty based on household con-
sumptions, show that the South experiences much worse living conditions (Istat
2011d). The South witnesses also the highest level of PARP3 (22 % in 2010), three and
four times higher than in the Centre and North, with 8.9 and 4.8 %, respectively (see
Fig. 2). Moreover, the share of ARP individuals in the South, who have been persistently
poor, reaches 71.2 % in 2010 (in comparison with 63.5 and 47 % in the Centre and
North, respectively).
Earnings from work are the main source of income. So the functioning of the labour
market plays a key role in determining the households’ income distribution. Among
workers, middle-aged employees in large industrial firms are more likely to hold per-
manent positions, and they rely on more stable economic resources. In contrast,
women and the young typically have access to short-term, low-paying jobs only (Baldini
and Ciani 2011).
Furthermore, the welfare system, very often assimilated to the Southern-European
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Fig. 2 Persistent at risk of poverty rate in Italy by geographical area, 2007-2010. Source: Authors’ calculation
on EU-SILC longitudinal UDB
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income maintenance system, based on different eligibility criteria and most recent
earnings’ replacement rates and addressing employees facing reduced work activities or
unemployment. The prevalent scheme against the risk of underemployment or tempor-
ary unemployment for workers in medium-large industrial firms (“Cassa Integrazione
Guadagni”, CIG) is based on contributory history and accessible to employees not in
managerial positions. CIG has an 80 % replacement rate, and it is capped at about 1150
euros per month as a gross amount.
Similarly, unemployment insurance is available mostly for employees in large firms. It
has a replacement rate between 40 and 60 % with the same cap as above. It is provided
for a period of 8 months, extended to 12 months for individuals aged 50 and over.
There are no means-tested benefits for individuals not eligible or no longer eligible for
unemployment benefits, and a system of minimum income level, independent on the
employment status, is also absent. As a consequence, employees in small firms and
self-employed and precarious workers are not protected (Figari et al. 2011; Baldini and
Ciani 2011).
The rationale for this kind of welfare regime is largely based on the so-called bread-
winner model, where a person’s earnings are the primary source of support for the
whole family. Generally speaking, adult men are expected to provide for their families;
hence, they are typically the beneficiaries for social allowances. Besides, workers cannot
rely on an adequate childcare system to reconcile work and family. The young do not
benefit from any specific employment policies or economic support to start a business.
The social sustainability of such a welfare framework is granted by informal processes.
It strongly relies on family ties and intergenerational solidarity, leaving families alone in
taking care for the young and elderly also in economic terms (Gal 2010).
Women’s condition in the labour market is characterised by occupational segregation,
lower returns from human capital, and lower wages (e.g. male and female full-time em-
ployees earn 1411 and 1257 euros per month, respectively, in 2010—see section 3.3.1
in Istat 2011c). In 2010, Italian women show lower employment rates than men (46.1
and 67.7 %, respectively), higher unemployment rates (9.7 vs 7.6 % of men), and much
higher inactivity rates (48.9 compared to 26.7 % of men) (Istat 2011b). Furthermore,
female employment rate in Italy is much lower than in Europe (58.2 % in 2010) (Istat
2011c, chapter 3). Women’s low labour market participation is strictly related to their
being responsible for most of the family care (Istat 2011e). Such a gendered division of
roles contributes to make families particularly vulnerable, because the job loss or a
labour income decrease experienced by the main earner is barely cushioned by other
household members’ economic resources (Figari et al. 2011).
Finally, the pension system is far from generous: 44 % of beneficiaries receive
monthly benefits of less than 1000 euros gross (Istat 2013a).
The South-North gap in terms of economic well-being may be explained by relevant
territorial differences in all the aspects so far discussed: the South is characterised by a
wider gender specialisation, lower labour participation, and higher unemployment rates
(Istat 2011b, c). In 2010, the employment rate is 43.9 % in the South, while it is higher
than 60 % in the other regions (i.e. 65 and 61.5 % in the North and Centre, respect-
ively). Besides, the unemployment rate in the South is 13.4 % (12 and 15.8 % for men
and women, respectively), while it is 5.9 % in the North and 7.6 % in the Centre.
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the South, 30.8 % in the North, and 33.4 % in the Centre) and achieves 63.7 % for
women (39.6 and 43.1 % of women in the North and Centre, respectively).
Provided this picture of welfare system and labour market characteristics, our main
research hypotheses concern the relationship between persistent poverty and (i) main
earner income source and gender, to investigate the combined effects of a welfare state
supporting mostly experienced employees and a gendered division of roles; (ii) the
temporal evolution of territorial gap at the beginning of a period of crisis, to investigate
territorial differences in terms of labour market and lack of adequate social protection
policies.
Hypothesis I: Main earner income from dependent employment is expected to be
associated with lower levels of persistent poverty. Employees are less at risk of losing
their job and more likely to be eligible for income maintenance schemes, in case of
need. A disadvantage for households whose main earner is a woman is expected be-
cause women traditionally play a secondary economic role.
Hypothesis II: Territorial differences are expected to increase in a period of crisis, be-
cause the possible determinants of persistent poverty are more prevalent in the South.
Data and methods
EU-SILC is the reference source for monitoring poverty and social exclusion in the
EU. It relies on output harmonised national surveys: target variables are produced
according to country-specific requirements, but common guidelines, procedures,
concepts, and classifications are adopted to maximise comparability (European
Commission 2003).
EU-SILC allows for both cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates. The longitudinal
component, conceived for the study of poverty as a dynamic phenomenon, is based on
a rotational sample design with four rotational groups, in Italy and most of the other
countries. As shown in Table 1, every year a new sample is drawn and followed for
4 years. In a given year, the cross-sectional sample is made of households and house-
hold members belonging to four different panels (at the first, second, third, and fourth
interview). At the moment of these analyses, four complete panels were available,
covering the period preceding the crisis (2004–2007) and the subsequent period that
includes the Great Recession beginning (2007–2010).
Italy applies a two-stage sampling design, where the first stage units are the munici-
palities and the second stage units are the households (Istat 2013b). Every year a sam-
ple of 8000 households is drawn and all household members belong to the sample.Table 1 Rotational sample design of Italian EU-SILC
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each panel (about 6200) and the corresponding number of household members (about
15,000). Differences in the sample size at the first wave are due to first wave non-
response and household composition. Some of the sample individuals exit the panel
temporarily or permanently, for non-response reasons or because they die or move
abroad (see Eurostat 2010, for a detailed description of EU-SILC target population and
following rules), and no information is available about their poverty condition. Being
PARP defined as the share of ARP individuals during the last year, and at least two out
of the three previous ones, it is computed only on individuals present in the panel dur-
ing four consecutive years (the so-called balanced panels). In turn, all the individuals
who exit the panel temporarily or permanently are dropped by the indicator computa-
tion and the analyses in the following.
As shown in Table 2, the balance panel size is about 10,000 individuals, i.e. 64.7 % of the
initial sample, with some small differences by panel. Likely, these individuals differ from
those who exit the panel according to some characteristics of interest and related to pov-
erty. If this is the case, estimates on the balance panel may be biased. For this reason, the
EU-SILC user database provides longitudinal weights that in principle correct for poten-
tial bias introduced by the sample selection (Eurostat 2010). In Italy, longitudinal weights
are provided at individual level and are adjusted for non-response, controlling for some
characteristics (territorial domain, demographic size of the municipalities, number of
household members, nationality, sex, age, education, and professional condition) (see Istat
2013b, for a detailed description of individual longitudinal weights).
The analyses we show in the following are based on the pooling of the four balanced
samples, and normalised longitudinal weights are used to control for potential bias.
It is worth noting that, according to Eurostat, individuals are—by definition—certainly
poor in the last year of observation, but not necessarily in the first one. Official indicator
breakdowns, thus, are provided according to individual characteristics at the last year of
observation. However, since in this paper we are interested in the determinants of poverty
dynamics, and trigger events, characteristics at the first wave are controlled for, as well as
some selected changes that occurred during the period of observation4.
We apply logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of being persistently poor:
persistently poor individuals are compared to all other individuals, regardless of the
pattern of poverty they experienced during the period of observation (i.e. never poor or
poor only in some of the years).
Poverty is computed at the household level: if the household equivalised disposable








rate (b)/(a) × 100
2004–2007 6259 15,822 10,466 66.1
2005–2008 6194 15,805 10,148 64.2
2006–2009 6167 15,389 9822 63.8
2007–2010 6115 15,302 9903 64.7
Total 24,735 62,318 40,339 64.7
Source: authors’ calculation on EU-SILC longitudinal UDB
Coppola and Di Laurea Genus  (2016) 72:3 Page 9 of 17disposable income), all the household members are poor. Coherently, also covariates
are computed at the household level. In particular, we control for household-specific
and main earner characteristics. The main earner is chosen because it is considered as
the most representative of the household economic condition. However, the analyses
are carried out at an individual level, for two main reasons. First, the PARP rate is com-
puted as the share of individuals living in such a condition. Since we are interested in
the analyses of the Europe 2020 indicator, as defined by Eurostat, we want to stay as
close as possible to the original definition. Second, longitudinal weighs are provided at
the individual level (i.e. they differ among the household members) because they cor-
rect for non-response at the individual level. Since all household members have the
same characteristics, robust standard errors are provided.
Tables 3 and 4 show some descriptive statistics for the qualitative and quantitative
covariates, respectively, by panel.
In order to verify our research hypotheses, we interact the main earner source of in-
come (from dependent employment, self-employment, old-age pensions or other
sources) with gender (hypothesis I) and the region of residence (North-Centre or
South) with the year (hypothesis II). Other control variables are household-specific
characteristics and their square: the number of earners, children5, and elderly6. Further-
more, main earner’s characteristics are worth of consideration: sex, age (in classes:
lower than 35, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65 or more), educational level (up to lower sec-
ondary education, secondary education, university degree or higher), and partner’s edu-
cational level. We also control for the following life events: change in the household
size and number of earners, new birth, new household formation, and change of the
main earner.
The estimates of average marginal effects are also shown, to provide an easier inter-
pretation of the model estimates (see Williams 2012, for a detailed description).
Results
Table 5 shows the logistic regression estimates for the pooled panels under analysis
and average marginal effects. The coefficients of the main earner’s source of in-
come show that, as expected, households relying mostly on income from
dependent employment are the least likely to be persistently poor. According to
average marginal effects, if the main earner’s income is from self-employment or
pensions, the probability of being persistently poor is about 3 and 4 % higher, re-
spectively. Such a probability is about 9 % higher when the household has to rely
on other sources of income. Moreover, if the main earner is a woman, then the
risk of living in a persistently poor household is 3 % higher. Interaction terms be-
tween sex and sources of income are also significant, suggesting that female disad-
vantage is lower when she earns income from self-employment or other sources.
Table 6 shows average marginal effects for women, by income source. We notice
that female main earners have a 3.7 and 4.9 % higher probability of being persist-
ently poor when their main income source is, respectively, dependent employment
or pensions. Thus, our first hypothesis seems to be confirmed by these estimates.
In comparison with the households whose main earner is an employee, all other
sources of income are either less stable and less protected by the welfare system in
case of unemployment or income decrease, as in the case of self-employment
Table 3 Covariates sample distributions by panel
Panel
2004–2007 2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 Total
n % n % n % n % n %
Region
North 4694 44.85 4219 41.57 4200 42.76 4220 42.61 17,333 42.97
Centre 2325 22.21 2534 24.97 2224 22.64 2185 22.06 9268 22.98
South 3447 32.94 3395 33.45 3398 34.60 3498 35.32 13,738 34.06
Sex
Male 7768 74.22 7529 74.19 7110 72.39 7221 72.92 29,628 73.45
Female 2698 25.78 2619 25.81 2712 27.61 2682 27.08 10,711 26.55
Source of income
Dep. empl. 5371 51.32 5168 50.93 4922 50.11 5334 53.86 20,795 51.55
Self-empl. 2079 19.86 2040 20.10 1900 19.34 1877 18.95 7896 19.57
Old-age pensions 2664 25.45 2601 25.63 2621 26.68 2375 23.98 10,261 25.44
Other sources 352 3.36 339 3.34 379 3.86 317 3.20 1387 3.44
Age
<35 1832 17.50 1661 16.37 1448 14.74 1496 15.11 6437 15.96
35–44 2697 25.77 2749 27.09 2618 26.65 2567 25.92 10,631 26.35
45–54 2410 23.03 2262 22.29 2267 23.08 2409 24.33 9348 23.17
55–64 1693 16.18 1557 15.34 1531 15.59 1560 15.75 6341 15.72
65+ 1834 17.52 1919 18.91 1958 19.93 1871 18.89 7582 18.80
Educational level
Up to lower secondary 5793 55.35 5408 53.29 5330 54.27 5236 52.87 21,767 53.96
Secondary 3545 33.87 3643 35.90 3373 34.34 3458 34.92 14,019 34.75
University or higher 1128 10.78 1097 10.81 1119 11.39 1209 12.21 4553 11.29
Partner’s educational level
No partner 2991 28.58 2738 26.98 2754 28.04 2666 26.92 11,149 27.64
Up to lower secondary 4460 42.61 4158 40.97 4036 41.09 4001 40.40 16,655 41.29
Secondary 2122 20.28 2307 22.73 2054 20.91 2328 23.51 8811 21.84
University or higher 893 8.53 945 9.31 978 9.96 908 9.17 3724 9.23
Change in no. of earners
No change 6020 57.52 5694 56.11 5666 57.69 5649 57.04 23,029 57.09
Gained only 1983 18.95 1965 19.36 1872 19.06 1085 10.96 6905 17.12
Lost only 1271 12.14 1057 10.42 916 9.33 1816 18.34 5060 12.54
Gained and lost 1192 11.39 1432 14.11 1368 13.93 1353 13.66 5345 13.25
Change in household size
No 8245 78.78 7969 78.53 8046 81.92 7972 80.50 32,232 79.90
Yes 2221 21.22 2179 21.47 1776 18.08 1931 19.50 8107 20.10
New birth
No 10,024 95.78 9742 96.00 9462 96.33 9572 96.66 38,800 96.18
Yes 442 4.22 406 4.00 360 3.67 331 3.34 1539 3.82
New household
No 10,214 97.59 9906 97.62 9641 98.16 9708 98.03 39,469 97.84
Yes 252 2.41 242 2.38 181 1.84 195 1.97 870 2.16
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Table 3 Covariates sample distributions by panel (Continued)
Change in main earner
No 7451 71.19 7211 71.06 7072 72.00 6943 70.11 28,677 71.09
Yes 3015 28.81 2937 28.94 2750 28.00 2960 29.89 11,662 28.91
Total 10,466 100.00 10,148 100.00 9822 100.00 9903 100.00 40,339 100.00
Source: authors’ calculation on EU-SILC longitudinal UDB
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old-age pensions. The disadvantage of households is greater when the main earner
is a woman and especially when her income is from dependent employment or
pensions, possibly as a consequence of their lower wages.
As for the dynamic of PARP and territorial differences, the estimates show (i) a slight
decrease in the probability of being persistently poor, which becomes 2.6 % lower at
the beginning of the crisis, and (ii) a clear disadvantage of the South, characterised by a
probability of experiencing persistent poverty 12.9 % higher than in the North. The
Centre shows a higher risk of persistent poverty, but it is only about 3 % higher than in
the North. The interaction effect between year and region of residence shows a further
disadvantage of the South in comparison with the North only before the crisis (2005–
2008), while it becomes no longer significant in the following years. Table 6 shows the
estimates of average marginal effects for the Centre and the South in comparison with
the North, by year. Noticeably, the South shows a relevant decrease in the risk of being
persistently poor at the beginning of the crisis, when the probability is 11.6 % higher
than in the North, while it was about 13 % in the previous years. Thus, our second re-
search hypothesis is not supported by the data: territorial dualism was wider before the
crisis and decreased in 2010. This is likely to be due to worsening economic conditions
in the North and Centre at the beginning of the crisis, implying a reduction in the dis-
advantage for the South. An explanation may be found in how the crisis spread over
economic activities. Macro-level figures from National Accounts flows (Istat 2013c)
show from 2009 (i.e. the income reference period corresponding to the 2010 EU-SILC
survey data) a negative impact on household sector disposable income which is more
pronounced in the Northern regions. This may be explained by a greater impact of the
economic downturn on the export-led production and domestic demand in the North
and Centre than in the South. Our results suggest that a similar dynamics holds on in-
come distribution at a micro-level and on persistent poverty as well.
Other main earner and household characteristics and relative changes contribute to
determine the likelihood of persistent poverty. Concerning the main earnerTable 4 Covariates sample means and standard deviation by panel
Panel
2004–2007 2005–2008 2006–2009 2007–2010 Total
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Age 49.04 15.26 49.56 15.41 50.05 15.27 49.95 15.16 49.64 15.28
No. of earners 2.01 0.91 1.96 0.87 1.92 0.87 2.12 1.01 2.00 0.92
No. of children 0.73 0.94 0.77 0.97 0.76 0.99 0.75 0.97 0.75 0.97
No. of elder 0.38 0.68 0.39 0.68 0.41 0.70 0.40 0.69 0.39 0.69
Source: authors’ calculation on EU-SILC longitudinal UDB







Sex (ref = Male)
Female 0.4797 0.0889 *** 0.0328 0.0052 ***
Source of Income (ref = dependent employment)
Self-employment 0.5252 0.0698 *** 0.0335 0.0053 ***
Old-age pensions 0.5015 0.1012 *** 0.0421 0.0080 ***
Other income sources 1.2550 0.1285 *** 0.0987 0.0115 ***
Year (ref = 2004–2007)
2005–2008 −0.3810 0.1163 ** −0.0201 0.0052 ***
2006–2009 −0.3391 0.1139 ** −0.0139 0.0051 **
2007–2010 −0.4215 0.1193 *** −0.0258 0.0052 ***
Region (ref = North)
Centre 0.4368 0.1230 *** 0.0320 0.0044 ***
South 1.3135 0.0954 *** 0.1286 0.0043 ***
Age (ref = <35 years old)
35–44 −0.6359 0.0773 *** −0.0521 0.0066 ***
45–54 −0.3151 0.0798 *** −0.0277 0.0072 ***
55–64 −0.3214 0.1036 ** −0.0282 0.0091 **
65+ −0.0711 0.1531 −0.0066 0.0141
Educational level (ref = up to lower secondary)
Secondary −0.9325 0.0577 *** −0.0764 0.0044 ***
University degree or higher −2.2765 0.1588 *** −0.1323 0.0049 ***
Partner’s educational level (ref = no partner)
Up to lower secondary −0.0909 0.0682 −0.0082 0.0062
Secondary −0.6197 0.0886 *** −0.0492 0.0069 ***
University degree or higher −1.2214 0.1439 *** −0.0835 0.0081 ***
Household composition
No. of earners −1.7748 0.1106 *** −0.1475 0.0092 ***
No. of earners2 0.1691 0.0250 *** 0.0141 0.0021 ***
No. of children 0.6897 0.0703 * 0.0573 0.0058 ***
No. of children2 −0.0071 0.0191 −0.0006 0.0016
No. of elder 0.0125 0.1682 0.0010 0.0140
No. of elder2 0.1132 0.0644 0.0094 0.0054
Change in no. of earners
Gained only −0.2324 0.0616 *** −0.0166 0.0043 ***
Lost only 1.2421 0.0833 *** 0.1227 0.0094 ***
Gained and lost 0.8210 0.0679 *** 0.0747 0.0068 ***
Other household changes
Change in household size (ref = no) −0.3946 0.0803 *** −0.0310 0.0059 ***
New birth (ref = no) 0.4166 0.1359 ** 0.0377 0.0133 **
New household (ref = no) −0.2356 0.1774 −0.0186 0.0132
Change in main earner (ref = no) 0.2356 0.0592 *** 0.0201 0.0052 ***
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Table 5 Logistic regression estimates of persistent at risk of poverty individuals and average
marginal effects (Continued)
Sex and source of income
Female, self-employment −0.3494 0.1485 *
Female, old-age pensions 0.0257 0.1168
Female, other income sources −0.6693 0.2024 **
Year and region
2005–2008, Centre −0.1307 0.1819
2006–2009, Centre 0.2806 0.1421 *
2007–2010, Centre 0.1141 0.1800
2005–2008, South 0.2808 0.1384 *
2006–2009, South 0.2463 0.1835
2007–2010, South 0.1348 0.1446
Constant −0.5364 0.1490 ***
Nr. of observations 40,339
Pseudo R2 0.293
Log pseudolikelihood −11,018.5
Source: authors’ calculation on EU-SILC longitudinal UDB
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
Coppola and Di Laurea Genus  (2016) 72:3 Page 13 of 17characteristics, age is relevant: as expected, households whose main earner is middle-
aged are better off. In comparison with young main earners (less than 35 years old),
those aged between 35 and 44 show a probability of about 5 % lower to be persistently
poor, and those aged 45–54 or 55–64 about 2.8 % lower. In contrast, elder main
earners do not significantly differ from the young. Thus, when the main earner is either
young or old, the household is more likely to be persistently poor. The former are less
likely to have achieved a job position that guarantees economic stability or theTable 6 Average marginal effects, by combination of some specific characteristics
dy/dx Unconditional std. err. Sign.
Female
Dependent employment 0.0366 0.0072 ***
Self-employment 0.0117 0.0115
Old-age pensions 0.0489 0.0087 ***
Other income sources −0.0215 0.0209
Centre
2004–2007 0.0329 0.0096 **
2005–2008 0.0175 0.0078 *
2006–2009 0.0350 0.0088 ***
2007–2010 0.0430 0.0090 ***
South
2004–2007 0.1254 0.0088 ***
2005–2008 0.1353 0.0085 ***
2006–2009 0.1383 0.0081 ***
2007–2010 0.1155 0.0081 ***
Source: authors’ calculation on EU-SILC longitudinal UDB
***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05
Coppola and Di Laurea Genus  (2016) 72:3 Page 14 of 17requisites to access social protection benefits. The latter are recipients of a relatively
lower and stagnant income.
Main earner’s educational achievement is strongly associated with persistent poverty.
Highly educated main earners represent households with a much lower risk of be-
ing persistently poor (i.e. those with secondary and tertiary education have,
respectively, a 7.6 and 13.2 % lower probability than those with lower secondary
education). Also the presence of a partner, if highly educated, is relevant. In com-
parison with single main earners, if he/she has a partner with secondary or tertiary
education, the household experiences a risk of being persistently poor, respectively,
4.9 and 8.3 % lower. The presence of a partner with low education does not make
any significant difference.
The household composition is also relevant. The risk of being persistently poor in-
creases linearly with the number of children, representing a source of additional costs
and needs, as argued, not supported by ad hoc policies. The higher the number of
earners, the lower the likelihood of being persistently poor, even if at a decreasing rate.
The presence of the elderly, instead, is not associated with a higher risk of experiencing
poverty persistently.
The changes that occurred in the households over the period of observation are also
related to persistent poverty. Among the events accounted for, the change in number
of earners has a preeminent role. By comparing the number of earners in different
years, we distinguish among (i) households with the same number of earners in the
whole period of observation, (ii) households that have only lost earners (one or more),
(iii) households that have only gained earners (one or more), and (iv) households that
have both lost and gained earners. The estimates show a slight comparative advantage
for those having acquired new earners (showing a 1.7 % lower probability in compari-
son with households with the same number of earners). In contrast, those who have
only lost earners, or both lost and gained earners, respectively, show a 12.3 and 7.5 %
higher probability of being persistently poor. Earner loss reduces household economic
resources, and it is not balanced by the concurrent gain of other earners in the same
period.
Any change in the household size (either an increase or a decrease) is associated with
a slightly lower risk of persistent poverty, as is the case for a new household formation.
This could be the result of selection: possibly only less vulnerable households engage in
structural changes. A new birth, instead, seems to elude this mechanism and is associ-
ated with a 3.8 % higher probability of being persistently poor. If the main earner
changes, the household is only 0.5 % more likely to be persistently poor. A non-
significant difference is estimated for new households.
Conclusions
We analyse the PARP rate in Italy between 2007 and 2010. This measure of poverty is
one of the main indicators used by the European Commission to monitor poverty and
social exclusion in the European Union and the only one representing poverty as a
dynamic phenomenon. This can help shedding light on the possible determinants of
persistent poverty.
Among the poor, the persistently poor are the most vulnerable, because they rarely
quit this condition and, even if they do, they are more likely to face other spells of
Coppola and Di Laurea Genus  (2016) 72:3 Page 15 of 17poverty in the future. Thus, policies aiming at reducing poverty, as recommended by
the Europe 2020 EU’s growth strategy, should focus on this group.
Italy represents an interesting case study in the EU being exposed to one of the lar-
gest and most persistent poverty rate. Moreover, Italy is characterised by a dramatic ter-
ritorial dualism, with the South experiencing extremely worse living conditions than
the rest of the country.
A weak labour market and an inadequate social protection system characterise this
landscape. In particular, the young and women are less favourite in the labour market.
The former typically have access to less stable and worse paid jobs. The latter can
hardly reconcile family tasks with work. Among workers, only specific categories are
supported in case of job loss or income decrease, particularly middle-aged employees
in medium-large size firms. This situation is worsened by a welfare system that relies
heavily on family ties and that does not address the needs of worse-off households
through either universal or means-tested policies. The territorial dualism in terms of
persistent poverty is partly explained by an even less favourable labour market in the
South, characterised by higher unemployment rates, combined with a more traditional
division of roles and the subsequent lower women’s commitment to paid work.
In this framework, we focus on the interaction between the Italian labour market and
welfare characteristics in shaping the likelihood of being persistently poor, according to
households’ main earner source of income and gender, as well as the temporal evolu-
tion of the territorial dualism during the crisis. As expected, households whose main
earner is a recipient of income from dependent employment show lower levels of per-
sistent poverty, because social interventions are tailored in order to protect (part of )
them: they are less likely to lose their job and, if they do, they may be eligible to receive
some unemployment insurance. In contrast, self-employed and retirees face worse eco-
nomic conditions. The former cannot rely on ad hoc policies in case of job loss, earning
decrease, or reduced economic activity; the latter mostly receive lower and stagnant re-
tirement benefits. When the main earner is a woman, the household is more likely per-
sistently poor because women traditionally play a secondary economic role in Italy.
As for the territorial dualism, the South disadvantage decreases at the beginning of
the crisis (2010). A possible explanation is the worsening economic conditions experi-
enced at the beginning of the crisis by the North and Centre, which were affected to a
wider extent by the economic downturn.
Other main earner and household characteristics are relevant in determining the risk
of being persistently poor. Particularly worth of consideration is human capital endow-
ment that shows a key role in preventing persistent poverty. The presence of children,
instead, makes households more vulnerable. As foreseen, the more the earners in the
household, the lower is the risk of persistent poverty. The loss of any earner determines
a higher risk of poverty persistence and is not balanced by the gain of other earners.
According to our results, the Italian welfare regime appears inadequate to protect
worse-off households from the persistent experience of poverty. Policies aiming to pro-
mote employment, new entries or re-entries into the labour market, and women labour
force participation are appropriate strategies to let households escape from poverty. Ad
hoc policies should focus also on the elderly and households with children.
The evidence discussed in this paper is certainly not exhaustive. However, the short
period of observation of individuals in EU-SILC hampers the explanatory power of
Coppola and Di Laurea Genus  (2016) 72:3 Page 16 of 17other more sophisticated methods of analysis (Eiffe and Till 2013). We plan to investi-
gate poverty transitions and take explicitly into account poverty duration, as well as the
exact timing and pattern of changes in the household characteristics, when richer data
will be available.
Endnotes
1The ARP and PARP rates are estimated on the EU-SILC cross-sectional and longitu-
dinal samples, respectively (the latter is a sub-sample of the former).
2The severe material deprivation refers to a state of economic strain and the inability
to afford four or more of the following items: unexpected expenses; a 1-week annual
holiday away from home; a meal involving meat, chicken, or fish every second day; the
adequate heating of a dwelling; a washing machine; a coloured television, telephone, or
car; and payment arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills, hire purchase instalments or
other loan payments).
3The PARP rate in year t is computed on individuals interviewed in year t and the
previous 3 years (e.g. PARP 2007 is computed on individuals belonging to the 2004–
2007 panel).
4If characteristics at last year of observation are controlled for, trigger events cannot
be included in the model, because their effects would already be implied in the charac-
teristics as observed in the last wave (e.g. the number of children in the last year of ob-
servation already includes the possible effect of a birth occurred during the period of
observation). However, models with household and main earner characteristics at last
wave have also been estimated: results appear mostly consistent and are available upon
request.
5All household members less than 18 years old are defined as children.
6All household members aged 65 years or more are defined as elderly.
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